The so-called flank march from the Ryazána to the Tarútino camp was the result of a multiplicity of circumstances at the time. It was not due to someone’s feat of military brilliance, as some now believe.
The so-called flank march from the Ryazána to the Tarútino camp was the result of a multiplicity of circumstances at the time. It was not due to someone’s feat of military brilliance, as some now believe.
Book 13, Chapter 1
The so-called flank march from the Ryazána to the Tarútino camp was the result of a multiplicity of circumstances at the time. It was not due to someone’s feat of military brilliance, as some now believe.
Summary:
In this chapter Tolstoy returns to his theme of the causes of historical events, this time pointing out that the so-called flank march from the Ryazána to the Tarútino camp was not due to anyone’s military genius. Today, historians ascribe the glory of that achievement of genius to different men. But really, it was due to a number of diverse circumstances on the ground at the time. Originally what seemed needed was a direct retreat on Nízhni-Nóvgorod. But most of the Russian provisions lay in a more southerly direction, accessible via the Kalúga road. And, if things had gone differently, such as for example if Napoleon had attacked the Russians more vigorously, it could have proved ruinous to the Russians and salutary for the French. Also, if the Russian army retreated on Nízhni the army would be separated from its supplies by the broad river Oká, which cannot be crossed early in winter. Then, too, concern for the safety of the arsenal at Túla caused the army to turn further south. So, it is impossible to say precisely when, or by whom, it was decided to make this so-called flank movement, which is now remembered as a brilliant decision attributed to some individual or another. It was simply the logical thing to do at the time.
quote from the chapter:
The army turned more to the south, along the Ryazán road and nearer to its supplies. Subsequently the inactivity of the French (who even lost sight of the Russian army), concern for the safety of the arsenal at Túla, and especially the advantages of drawing nearer to its supplies caused the army to turn still further south to the Túla road. Having crossed over, by a forced march, to the Túla road beyond the Pakhrá, the Russian commanders intended to remain at Podólsk and had no thought of the Tarútino position; but innumerable circumstances and the reappearance of French troops who had for a time lost touch with the Russians, and projects of giving battle, and above all the abundance of provisions in Kalúga province, obliged our army to turn still more to the south and to cross from the Túla to the Kalúga road and go to Tarútino, which was between the roads along which those supplies lay. Just as it is impossible to say when it was decided to abandon Moscow, so it is impossible to say precisely when, or by whom, it was decided to move to Tarútino. Only when the army had got there, as the result of innumerable and varying forces, did people begin to assure themselves that they had desired this movement and long ago foreseen its result.
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