Neither the French nor the Russians had good a priori reasons to battle at Shevárdino or Borodinó.
Summary:
In this chapter Tolstoy discusses the French and Russian decisions to fight at Shevárdino and then at Borodinó. Tolstoy believes there was not the least sense in it for either the French or the Russians. As he says, if the commanders had been guided by reason, it would seem that it must have been obvious to Napoleon that by advancing thirteen hundred miles and giving battle with a probability of losing a quarter of his army, he was advancing to certain destruction, and it must have been equally clear to Kutúzov that by accepting battle and risking the loss of a quarter of his army he would certainly lose Moscow. Tolstoy reiterates his theme that battles seldom unfold in a reasoned manner. He provides various examples of how historians fabricate plausible explanations for battlefield events after the fact.
quote from the chapter:
Why and how were the battles of Shevárdino and Borodinó given and accepted? Why was the battle of Borodinó fought? There was not the least sense in it for either the French or the Russians. Its immediate result for the Russians was, and was bound to be, that we were brought nearer to the destruction of Moscow-which we feared more than anything in the world; and for the French its immediate result was that they were brought nearer to the destruction of their whole army-which they feared more than anything in the world. What the result must be was quite obvious, and yet Napoleon offered and Kutúzov accepted that battle.
Book 10, Chapter 19
Neither the French nor the Russians had good a priori reasons to battle at Shevárdino or Borodinó.
Summary:
In this chapter Tolstoy discusses the French and Russian decisions to fight at Shevárdino and then at Borodinó. Tolstoy believes there was not the least sense in it for either the French or the Russians. As he says, if the commanders had been guided by reason, it would seem that it must have been obvious to Napoleon that by advancing thirteen hundred miles and giving battle with a probability of losing a quarter of his army, he was advancing to certain destruction, and it must have been equally clear to Kutúzov that by accepting battle and risking the loss of a quarter of his army he would certainly lose Moscow. Tolstoy reiterates his theme that battles seldom unfold in a reasoned manner. He provides various examples of how historians fabricate plausible explanations for battlefield events after the fact.
quote from the chapter:
Why and how were the battles of Shevárdino and Borodinó given and accepted? Why was the battle of Borodinó fought? There was not the least sense in it for either the French or the Russians. Its immediate result for the Russians was, and was bound to be, that we were brought nearer to the destruction of Moscow-which we feared more than anything in the world; and for the French its immediate result was that they were brought nearer to the destruction of their whole army-which they feared more than anything in the world. What the result must be was quite obvious, and yet Napoleon offered and Kutúzov accepted that battle.
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